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Wage discrimination against women is prohibited by both 
the Equal Pay Act1 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.2 While 
Title VII contains a broad prohibition against any form of em-
ployment discrimination, the Equal Pay Act specifically ad-
dresses the problem of unequal wages between men and women 
workers. The Equal Pay Act requires that men and women who 
perform "substantially equal" work receive equal compensation 
but does not apply when men and women are segregated in the 
. workplace and, therefore, perform different jobs.3 
* Second Year Student, Golden Gate School of Law. 
1. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (d) (1) (Supp. IT 1978) provides: 
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of 
this section shall discriminate, within any establishment in 
which such employees are -employed, between employees on 
the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such estab-
lishment at a rate less than the rate he pays wages to employ-
ees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work 
on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, 
and responsibility, and which are performed under similar 
working conditions. 
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (Supp. IT 1978) states in part: 
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect 
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em- . 
ployment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants 
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to 
deprive any individual of employment opportqnities or other-
wise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of 
such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin. 
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Because application of the Equal Pay Act is limited by the 
"substantially equal" requirement, women seek relief for wage 
discrimination under Title VII using a theory of comparable' 
worth, also known as comparable work or comparable value the-
ory.4 Comparable worth is based on the premise that all employ-
ees who perform work of equal value to their employers should 
be paid equal wages.1\ 
Several recent wage discrimination cases have been brought 
under a theory of comparable worth, with the plaintiffs charging 
violations of both the Equal Pay Act and Title VII.s The circuit 
courts that have heard these cases reached differing conclusions 
on the proper relationship between the two Acts and on the via-
bility of a comparable worth standard. '1 The Supreme Court has 
granted certiorari in one such case, Gunther v. County of Wash-
ington,8 and will decide whether the standards required by the 
Equal Pay Act are also required in wage discrimination suits 
under Title VII. Although conclusions are grounded in statutory 
interpretation and legislative history, the courts ultimately bal-
ance the economic effects on the employer and labor market 
against the economic rights of women.9 
4. Lemons v. City of Denver, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 244 
(l.'980) (city-employed nurses sued their employer for violating Title VII by paying them 
low wages that reflected the community wage scale); Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 
(8th Cir. 1977) (university clerical workers charged they were paid less than physical 
plant workers for work of equal value to their employer and that this discriminated 
against them as women); IUE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980) 
(female factory workers claimed their employer used discriminatory job evaluations to 
determine wages and job levels, resulting in low salaries for jobs filled by women); Gun-
ther v. County of Washington, 602 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1979), rehearing denied, 623 F.2d 
1303 (1980), aff'd, 49 U.S.L.W. 4623 (U.S. June 8, 1981). See note 212 infra. 
5. Employers use several methods of job evaluation to determine wages and the rel-
ative values of jobs. See notes 196-209 infra and accompanying text. 
6. See cases cited note 4 supra. 
7. The Fifth, Tenth, and Eighth Circuits refuse to recognize a theory of comparable 
worth, while the Third and Ninth Circuits have upheld the validity of a limited compa-
rable worth theory. 
8. 602 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1979), rehearing denied, 623 F.2d 1303 (1980), aff'd, 49 
U.S.L.W. 4623 (U.S. June 8, 1981). 
9. See cases cited note 4 supra. See also Orr v. MacNeill & Son, Inc., 511 F.2d 166 
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975) (female head of department unsuccessfully 
claimed wage discrimination based on fact that some male department heads earned 
more than plaintiff); Ammons v. Zia, 448 F.2d 117 (10th Cir. 1971) (plaintiff, an em-
ployee at the Apollo test site, failed to establish that her denial of test site clearance, 
which was granted to male employees, would have entitled her to higher pay, and that 
she was performing work equal to higher paid males). 
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This Comment will briefly trace the history of job segrega-
tion from colonial America to the present, and explore the rela-
tionship between the Equal Pay Act and Title VII in light of the 
controversial Bennett Amendment.Io The interpretation of this 
Amendment, which limits the effect of the Equal Pay Act on 
Title VII, has lead to arguments both for and against adoption 
of a comparable worth standard by the courts. A comparison of 
opinions of the various courts concerning the amendment will 
follow, focusing on the emerging theory of equal pay for compa-
rable worth. A discussion of different job evaluation techniques 
and suggestions on how to use these evaluations as proof of dis-
crimination is included. 
I. WOMEN'S WORK-PAST AND PRESENT 
A. THE EVOLUTION OF JOB SEGREGATION 
Traditionally, work done by women in America served a vi-
tal function in the growth and maintenance of society. While 
women perform important jobs, their work is undervalued by 
employers because it is weighed on a scale in which "male" 
traits, such as physical strength and aggression, rate high. Be-
cause the job market is segregated by gender, the low value as-
signed "women's work" is reflected in low salaries, whether the 
work is exactly the same as work done by men or merely worth 
the same to their employerP 
In colonial America women produced all essential manufac-
tured goods. They bore the responsibility of manufacturing be-
cause they were considered unfit for heavy manual labor and, 
therefore, remained at home while men worked in the fields.12 
Because the colonists strove to develop a strong agrarian econ-
omy, agricultural work received a higher societal value than the 
supplying of domestic necessities.Is After the American Revolu-
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1978). See notes 106-141 infra and accompanying text. 
11. See notes 43-47 infra and accompanying text. 
12. Blau, The Data on Women Workers, Past, Present, and Future, in WOMEN 
WORKING-THEORIES AND FACTS IN PERSPECTIVE 30 (A. Stromberg & S. Harkess eds. 
1978). Colonial women manufactured essentials such as soap, cloth, candles, and lace. 
Pilgrims made these goods because they no longer had ready access to products available 
in England. [d. at 32. 
13. S. MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 48-49 (1965). The 
colonists' emphasis on agriculture was based in part on England's control. England 
wanted the colonies to provide her with sorely needed produce, and, in turn, wanted a 
3
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tion, women continued to perform primarily domestic func-
tions,!· although some women did work outside the home as 
school teachers, midwives, and nurses.IG 
Segregation of women into lower paying occupations inten-
sified with the Industrial Revolution in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury, as women became a major force in the growing textile in-
dustry.ls The proliferation of textile factories allowed women to 
supplement farm income with part-time work away from home. I" 
Although employed outside of the house, a woman working at 
the mill did the same job she had done at home;18 thus, factory 
work provided her with no new skills. 
With industrialization, growing numbers of families aban-
doned farming altogether and moved into urban areas.19 Some 
women were forced to stay at home to care for children who 
were no longer occupied with farm chores; others continued to 
captive market for her own manufactured goods. Thus, agriculture became the only ma-
jor profitable industry. The manufacture of goods, while essential in lowering the volume 
of English imports, was not essential to the colonial economy directly. ld. 
14. E. DEXTER, CAREER WOMEN OF AMERICA: 1776-1840, at 224 (1950). Dexter sug-
gests that women generally had more freedom before the Revolution than after: 
It appears . . . women were accorded somewhat less freedom 
after the Revolution, [which was] dedicated to the ideal that 
all men were 'created equal, than they had enjoyed before it 
. . • [I]n pioneer days there were few codes, legal or tradi-
tional: matters were dealt with as they came up, according to 
the English Common Law [which was] adapted to fit new con-
ditions. The Revolution was followed by a mania for codifying, 
all done of course by men. Apparently they were not ready to . 
accept formally some conditions they had tacitly permitted, 
and so perhaps unconsciously, they curtailed the existing priv-
ileges of women. . 
ld. at 223-24. 
15. ld. at 29. Women taught boys and girls through age 10, and young women. The 
more important task of educating young men was left to,the male school master. ld. at 2. 
16. Women's dominant role. in the textile industry began with women working at 
home, spinning wool into yarn to meet family needs, and selling the surplus to weavers. 
Blau, supra note 12, at 31. In 1850 there were over 12,000 cotton factories and over 1,500 
woolen mills in the United States. S. MORISON, supra note 13, at 483. 
17. Kulm, An Economist's View of Woman's Work, in CORPORATE LIB: WOMEN'S 
CHALLENGE TO THE MANAGEMENT 64 (E. Ginzberg & A. Yohalem eds. 1973). 
18. Blau, supra note 12, at 31. 
19. In the 1840's, the population of towns and cities with over 8,000 inhabitants 
increased by 90%. S. MORISON, supra note 13, at 483. 
Women's Law Forum 
4
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 3 [1981], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol11/iss3/3
1981] EQUAL PAY 805 
work at the mills.20 Young, single women, eager to escape the 
drudgery of rural life, comprised another growing section of the 
work force.21 The shift from an agrarian to an industrial society 
affected a marked change on the role of women. On the farm, 
women's work, while undervalued, had been an integral part of 
rural life and survival. In the cities, however, there was no 
equally significant work for women.22 Although textile mills, and 
later garment factories, continued to employ women into the 
twentieth century, few other industries were open to women. 
The influx of immigrants to the growing labor market during 
this period intensified the exclusion of women from occupations 
in new industries.23 
The participation of the United States in World War I 
forced women into occupations that would have otherwise been 
unavailable to them.24 Despite the success of the suffrage move-
ment in 1919, by 1920 women had returned to traditional em-
ployment to make way for the returning troops.215 Nevertheless, 
during the first two decades of the twentieth century women 
dominated certain rapidly growing fields, particularly clerical 
work and retail sales.26 
During the Great Depression both women and men were 
among the unemployed; increasing numbers of women found it 
necessary to seek employment to supplement their husbands' in-
20. Kuhn, supra note 17, at 64. 
21. S. MORISON, supra note 13, at 483. 
22. Kuhn, supra note 17, at 64. 
23. The number of people immigrating to America increased from 300,000 in 1866 to 
789,000 in 1802. S. MORISON, supra note 13, at 768. Employers preferred hiring male 
immigrants because men were viewed as the traditional breadwinners, Blau, supra note 
12, at 33; and also because women generally worked only until marriage. S. MORISON, 
supra note 13, at 483. 
. 24. Women replaced male workers in iron and steel mills, as drivers for public trans-
portation, elevator operators, and bricklayers. They also gained prominent positions in 
the professions-notably as lawyers and doctors. W. CHAFE, THE AMERICAN WOMAN: HER 
CHANGING SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL ROLES, 1920-1970, at 51 (1972). 
25. Women were fired or forced out of their newly acquired positions when the war 
ended. Some male workers even went on strike to force women out of jobs. Twenty wo-
men appointed to the bench in New York State during the war were forced to resign 
immediately after the Armistice because their appointments had been only "emergency 
provisions." [d. at 53. 
26. "Almost one million women joined the clerical work force during the decade be-
ginning in 1910 and the proportion of female employees holding clerical and sales jobs 
jumped from 17 per cent in 1910 to 30 per cent in 1930." [d. at 55. 
5
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comes or to support their families. Throughout this period wo-
men were primarily employed in low-level white-collar and ser-
vice-oriented occupations.27 These jobs paid lower wages than 
blue-collar jobs, which, with the exception of those in the textile 
industry, remained unavailable to women.28 Employers justified 
underpaying women becaus~ of the common notion that women 
worked only to earn "pin money" and, therefore, shouldn't be 
allowed to take jobs from unemployed men, or men who worked 
at lower paying jobs.29 
World War II created even larger changes in the female la-
bor market than the previous war. The government, as well as 
private industry, realized the potential of solving the "manpower 
crisis" with womanpower.80 Women not only found satisfaction 
doing "non-traditional" work in the munitions factories and the 
transportation and construction industries, but also found sub-
stantially higher salaries than offered before.81 Women proved 
27. The 1930 census indicated that 30% of all working women worked in domestic 
and service fields, 19% as clerical workers, 17% in manufacturing, 14% were classified as 
professionals, 9% worked as skilled tradespersons, 9% in agriculture, and only 3% 
worked in transportation and communications. WOMEN WORKERS THROUGH THE DEPRES-
SION, THE AMERICAN WOMEN'S ASSOCIATION 51-52 (L. Pruette & I. Peters eds. 1934). The 
American Women's Association, which conducted an early survey of working women, 
gives a possible reason for the lack of women in trades: "The appeal of certain profes-
sions and of many clerical positions is derived from the pleasanter conditions of work as 
from other aspects. Many women will prefer a lower income and agreeable and dignified 
surroundings to the higher income under more distasteful conditions." [d. at 53. Presum-
ably, "distasteful conditions" included the hostility of male co-workers, as well as inade-
quate health and safety provisions. 
28. Female workers in all categories were underpaid. Women doing traditional wo-
men's work in garment factories and offices received notoriously low pay, while women 
doing the same jobs as men were paid less than men. In manufacturing, women received 
50-60% of what men earned. In 1937 women workers took home an average of $525 a 
year, compared to $1,027 a year for men. W. CHAFE, supra note 24, at 51. 
29. The pin-money hypothesis assumed that women workers were well-supported 
and sought a paying job only as a means of securing extra cash to indulge frivolous femi-
nine desires. The theory followed women workers wherever they went and, by implica-
tion, justified the inequality from which they suffered. If females were subsidized by 
their families, there was no compelling reason to treat them the same as men. Employers 
could rationalize paying women low wages on the ground that they did not need their 
earnings to live on, and public officials could dismiss women workers as casual members 
of the labor force who had no serious grievances. [d. at 53. 
30. "By April 1942 the proportion of women receiving government-sponsored voca-
tional training had leaped from 1 per cent to 13 per cent. And within seven months the 
number of jobs for which employers were willing to consider female applicants had 
climbed from 29 per cent to 55 per cent." [d. at 137. 
31. Thelma Carthen, who quit her job at Woolworths to become a welder in 1943 
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they could 'do a man's job, and do it well.32 
Although many women lost their jobs after the war, others 
remained active members of the work force. Large numbers of 
women found respectable work, in other words, low-level white-
collar jobs,33 after the war, thus compounding what would come 
to be known as the secretarial "ghetto." Nevertheless, despite 
the increasing number of working women, economic inequality 
prevailed. In 1951, all industries in which women constituted 
more than fifty percent of the work force paid wages below the 
national average. 3~ 
B. WOMEN'S ROLE TODAY 
In the 1960's, women's fight for economic and social equal-
ity accelerated. Yet, even today, while more women are working 
than ever before, and those performing nontraditional jobs re-
ceive media attention,315 economic discrimination against women 
remains largely unaffected. 
Statistics from 1960 to 1980 show that women continue to 
:fill predominantly secretarial positions in the white-collar sec-
tor.3S Women made their largest gains during this period within 
the professions,37 while their participation in blue-collar jobs di-
spoke of her work: "Actually, I like welding. There is no comparison to shipyard welding 
and assembly line, because I'll have a different job every day. . . I get sort of wound up 
in my work. I'm interested in how much I can do." CONVERSATIONS: WORKING WOMEN 
TALK ABOUT DOING A "MAN's JOB" 51 (T. Wetherby ed. 1977). Wages for workers making 
war materiel were 40% higher than wages in consumer factories. Commonly, women were 
able to double their salaries by leaving jobs as waitresses, secretaries, and laundresses for 
employment in the war industries. W. CHAFE, supra note 24, at 144. 
32. W. CHAFE, supra note 24, at 39. 
33. Women with training in new fields were able to secure industrial positions. In 
1946 women made up 40% of operatives in consumer industry and 13% in heavy indus-
try. The number of clerical workers increased by 100%, and generally, more women were 
working than ever before. ld. at 181-82. 
34. ld. at 185 (citing WOMEN'S BUREAU, EQUAL PAY INDICATORS, (1952». 
35. While the phrase "nontraditional job" brings to mind truck drivers, carpenters, 
and the like, statistics reveal executives, doctors, and professors may also belong in this 
category. See notes 41-45 infra and accompanying text. 
36. 1 EEOC EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY REPORT-1971, JOB PATl'ERNS FOR 
MINORITIES AND WOMEN IN PRIVATE INDUSTRY xxxxii (1972). In 1966, 56.9% of all work-
ing women were in white collar jobs; by 1971, that figure rose to 61.6%. A breakdown of 
the particular positions held by white collar women shows that, in 1966, 38.4% of all 
working women did office or clerical work, while only 2.4% were officials and managers 
and 2.9% were professionals. ld. 
37. In 1971, 6.6% of all working women were professionals-an increase of 3.7% 
7
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minished between 1966 and 1971.38 Within the blue-collar field, 
women were employed mostly as unskilled factory operatives.39 
Today, in 1981, little has changed. While more women hold 
managerial positions, fewer work in skilled high-paying blue-col-
lar jobs; their economic status in the work force remains the 
same!O 
Although attitudes towards women working in "nontradi-
tional jobs have changed somewhat, certain jobs remain linked 
to gender.·1 Prevailing attitudes are expressed by the treatment 
of women in educational and vocational institutions. School 
counselors, teachers, and parents often encourage young women 
to develop only those skills necessary to perform traditional wo-
men's work. Thus, a woman with the educational equivalent of a 
man lacks the experience or training required for a particular 
job, and the man will be hired!2 
Job segregation, or "balkanization,"43 fosters severe wage 
discrimination. Nearly all fields dominated by women yield 
lower salaries than those dominated by men!· Somewhat ironi-
from 1966. [d. 
38. The percentage of women blue collar workers decreased from 32% to 28.6% in 
1971. [d. 
39. In 1971, 19% of all women were factory operatives, compared to 2.5% working 
as skilled craft workers and 7% working as laborers. [d. 
40. Statistics for May 1980 8how that 66% of all working women are white collar 
workers. Within the white collar field, however, only 7% hold management positions, 
and 35% are clerical workers. Only 14% of all women are blue collar workers. DEP'T OF 
LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS 35 (1980). 
Generalized statistics are often misleading. "An increase in the number of women 
white collar workers may look promising, but women are invariably concentrated in the 
lower paying secretarial jobs. As of June 1980, the total clerical work force was 76.19% 
female, while men made up 83.6% of the blue collar field. Within the white collar field, 
however, women constituted 71.4% of all nonprofessional health workers, 70% of all 
school teachers, and 53% of all service workers. In the blue collar field, 95% of all craft 
and kindred workers were male, as were 98% of all mechanics. [d. 
41. Our language reflects these attitudes as well. "Secretary, for example, denotes 
not just job skills but female gender; nuraing is 80 sex-typed that one must make explicit 
the exception by specifying 'male nurae.' " J. KREPs, SEX IN THE MARKETPLACE, AMERICAN 
WOMEN AT WORK 35 (1971). 
42. WOMEN'S BUREAU, EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF LAB. 
BULL., THE EARNINGS GAP BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN 3-4 (1976). 
43. "Balkanization" refers to the division of a potentially strong unit, the workforce, 
into the segregated, ineffectual categories of men's and women's jobs. Because women are 
segregated, they can never gain the experience or education necessary to enter the male 
workplace. 
44. In 1974, the median weekly earnings for all managers and administrators (men 
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cally, the growing female presence in the work force has made 
the problem more acute. Balkanization has resulted in the over-
crowding of the female job market; the number of women seek-
ing work constantly expands while the number of jobs available 
to them remains limited."5 With supply far exceeding demand, 
employers need not pay women wages equal to those in male 
dominated fields."6 They are assured of finding women to work 
for whatever wages they care to offer. Because men need not 
seek lower paying jobs, the competition for higher paying posi-
tions increases, compounding job segregation."7 
II. FEDERAL LAW AND WAGE DISCRIMINATION 
Congress enacted the Equal Pay Act"8 in 1963. In this at-
tempt to end wage discrimination against women, Congress re-
quired that men and women be paid the same wages for per-
forming the same jobs."9 One year later, Congress passed the 
expansive Civil Rights Act of 1964.50 The Civil Rights Act gener-
ally prohibits discrimination based on race, sex, age, religion, or 
national origin. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act specifically pro-
hibits discrimination in employment, including wage discrimina-
tion.51 Considerable controversy exists over the relationship of 
Title VII and the Equal Pay Act; litigants and the judiciary have 
used both Acts to justify or invalidate a theory of equal pay for 
comparable worth. 
A. THE EQUAL PAY ACT 
The Equal Pay Act provides that an employer may not dis-
criminate against employees on the basis of sex by paying differ-
and women) was $250. In comparison, service workers earned a median $117. Craft work-
ers received a median salary of $211 a week, while clerical workers received only $140. 1 
EEOC, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY REPORT-1974 JOB PATTERNS FOR MINoRITIES 
AND WOMEN IN PRIVATE INDUSTRY 28 (1975). In 1976 the median weekly earnings of all 
full time women workers was $145; the median weekly earnings of all men was $234. U.S. 
DEP'T OF LAB. BULL., WORKING WOMEN: A DATABOOK 34 (1977). 
45. Jobs available to women are dictated by many factors, including the attitudes 
discussed above. 
46. Bergman, Occupational Segregation; Wages and Profits When Employers Dis-
criminate by Race or Sex, 1 E. ECON. J. 103-10 (1975). 
47. See note 44 supra. 
48. Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (Supp. II 1978). 
49. [d. 
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ent wages to employees performing jobs which require equal 
skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under 
similar working conditions.1I2 Courts interpret the Act to allow 
wage differentials between male and female workers unless the 
jobs in question are "substantially equal."IIS 
In an Equal Pay Act case, the employee has the burden of 
proving coverage of the Act and must then show a prima facie 
sex-based wage differential.M Four factors are used to determine 
whether two jobs are equal for purposes of comparison under the 
Act: skill, effort, responsibility, and similarity of working 
conditions.1I11 
Skill may be both mental and physical;1I6 it includes educa-
tion, experience, and training,II'1 provided the job actually re-
quires the superior training or experience of the employee. liS 
Similarly, effort is measured in terms of both physical and 
mental exertion required by a job. The occasional requirement 
of greater physical exertion will not constitute superior effort 
52. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (Supp. II 1978). For full text, see note 1 supra. 
53. Hodgson v. Robert Hall Clothes, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 1264 (D. Del. 1971), a!f'd in 
part, rev'd on other grounds, 473 F.2d 589 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973) 
(wage differential between women employees in women's clothing department and male 
employees in men's clothing department held justified). In Angelo v. Bacharach Instru-
ment Co., 555 F.2d 1164 (3d Cir. 1977), in which female bench assemblers were unable to 
prove they did work equal to that done by male heavy assemblers, the court said: "A 
showing of comparability of positions is not sufficient to give rise to an inference that the 
positions are equal." [d. at 1176. 
54. See generally Schultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
398 U.S. 905 (1970). 
55. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (Supp. II 1978). For full text, see note 1 supra. 
56. An example of comparable physical and mental skills is seen where two employ-
ees spend an equal amount of time at basic office work and the balance of their shifts at 
different tasks, one at bookkeeping and the other at loading and unloading stock. The 
physical skills required for lifting would be compared with the mental skills required by 
the bookkeeping. 
57. "Skill includes consideration of such factors as experience, training, education, 
and ability. It must be measured in terms of the performance requirements of the job." 
29 C.F.R •. § 800.125 (1980). 
58. "Possession of a skill not needed to meet the requirements of the job cannot be 
considered in making a determination regarding equality of skill." [d. See Peltier v. City 
of Fargo, 533 F.2d 374 (8th Cir. 1976) (duties of female and male police "car markers" 
identical; fact that the males were trained police officers did not justify 50% wage differ-
ential because police skills were not used on the job); Bullock v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 429 F. 
Supp. 424 (M.D. La. 1977) (a college education did not constitute superior skill of male 
unit manager of pizza parlor since there was no showing that a college education was 
required for performance of the job). 
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under the Act; the extra effort must be both a substantial and 
regular part of the employee's duties. Physical exertion must be 
weighed equally with both types of effort required by the job.ISS 
Job responsibility must also be equal. Responsibility is gauged 
by the amount of supervision under which an employee works 
and the amount of independent judgment and discretion an em-
ployee must use.60 The final factor used in determining equality 
of jobs is whether the jobs are performed under similar working 
conditions. Working conditions are determined by the job's sur-
roundings and the hazards to which a worker is exposed.61 For 
example, a shop employee works in different surroundings than 
the employee who makes house calls and, therefore, may be sub-
ject to different degrees of pressure. Similarly, because of job 
surroundings one employee may risk bodily harm, while another 
employee doing the same job in a different location may not.62 
These differences could warrant a wage differential. 
Despite these somewhat expansive, flexible criteria, the 
59. [S]uppose that a male checker employed by a supermarket is 
required to spend part of his time carrying out heavy packages 
or replacing stock involving the lifting of heavy items whereas 
a female checker is required to devote an equal degree of ef-
fort during a similar portion of her time to performing fill-in 
work requiring greater dexterity-such as rearranging displays 
of spices or other small items. The differentiation in kind of 
effort required does not • • . justify a wage differential • • • • 
Suppose, however, that men and women are working side by 
side on a line assembling parts. Suppose further that one of 
the men who performs the operations at the end of the line 
must also lift the assembly, as he completes his part of it, and 
place it on a waiting pallet. In such a situation, a wage differ-
ential might be justified for the person. • • who is required to 
expend the extra effort in the performance of his job, provided 
that the extra effort expended is substantial and is performed 
over a considerable portion of the work cycle. 
29 C.F.R. § 880.128 (1980). 
60. 29 C.F.R. §§ 800.129-.130 (1980). See Wirtz v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 265 F. Supp. 
787 (D. Mass. 1967) (wage differential justified because men on night shift in tag room 
worked under less supervision than women on day shift); Kilpatrick v. Sweet, 262 F. 
Supp. 561 (N.D. Fla. 1967) (difference in pay between male office manager and female 
bookkeeper justified because office manager was responsible for handling and depositing 
cash and needed to use personal judgment regarding expenditures). 
61. Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 
434 U.S. 1086 (1977) (airline stewardesses found to be doing work under same conditions 
as male pursers). 
62. See 29 C.F.R. § 800.132 (1980). See also Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 
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Equal Pay Act does not address the problem of job segregation, 
nor does it provide a remedy for those women who are trapped 
in low-paying, sex-segregated jobs. In a labor market segregated 
by gender,68 men and women perform different jobs, yet wage 
differentials between workers doing dissimilar work cannot be 
compared under the Equal Pay Act.lU A wage differential be-
tween male "orderlies" and female "nurses aides" was justified 
under the Equal Pay Act in Brennan v. Inglewood,6r> because the 
orderlies were trained to use a catheter with male patients (a 
more difficult operation than with female patients), and their 
duties included waxing floors and some heavy lifting. While the 
court found that the jobs in question were not substantially 
equal, the district court never addressed the fundamental ques-
tion of why females were given different tasks. Nor did the court 
compare the difference in job requirements with the wage differ-
ential. Failure to address job segregation is a basic inadequacy in 
Equal Pay Act cases. Because the courts never examine or at-
tempt to eradicate the underlying discrimination, the Equal Pay 
Act provides a superficial remedy applicable in only the most 
blatant cases of wage discrimination.66 
63. See notes 38-39 supra and accompanying text. 
64. [I]t is clear that Congress did not intend to apply the equal 
pay standard to jobs substantially differing in their terms and 
conditions. Thus the question of whether a female bookkeeper 
should be paid as much as a male file clerk required to per-
form a substantially different job is outside the purview of the 
equal pay provisions • • . [T]he equal pay standard is not to 
be applied where only men are employed in the establishment 
in one job and only women are employed in dissimilar job. . • 
the standard would not apply where only women are employed 
in clerk typist positions and only men are employed in jobs as 
administrative secretaries if the latter require substantially 
different duties. 
29 C.F.R. § 800.120 (1980). 
See also Krumbeck v. John Oster Mfg. Co., 63 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 44,265 (E.D. Wis. 
1970) (two women were denied coverage under the Equal Pay Act even though their jobs 
had been assigned the same point value by the employer as jobs performed by male co-
workers, because no males performed the same jobs). 
65. 412 F. Supp. 362 (S.D. Mo. 1975). 
66. For further explanation of the Equal Pay Act, see Johnson, Equal Pay Act of 
1963: A Practical Analysis, 24 DRAKE L. REv. 570 (1975). For a detailed history, see 
Elisburg, Equal Pay in the United States: The Development and Implementation of 
the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 LAB. L.J. 195 (1978). 
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Defenses 
The Equal Pay Act provides four affirmative defenses which 
an employer charged with a violation may raise.67 Once the 
plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of a sex-based wage differ-
ential between two substantially equal jobs, the burden shifts to 
the employer to prove one or more of the defenses. The defenses 
include a seniority system, a bona fide merit or evaluation sys-
tem, quantity or quality of product, or any factor other than sex. 
A seniority system which rewards employees with higher 
wages according to their length of employment with the com-
pany is justified even though it may result in a wage differential 
between employees performing equal work.68 A merit or job eval-
uation system helps the employer rate jobs in order to determine 
relative wages.69 If an employer can show a systematic, bona 
fide, and not purely subjective evaluation method was used to 
set the wages in question, the differential will survive scrutiny 
under the Act.70 Differing quantity or quality of work may also 
justify a difference in pay. If an employee sells more expensive 
goods, for example, or produces a more valuable item than other 
employees, an employer may pay that worker at a higher rate.71 
The fourth defense, "any other factor other than sex," operates 
as a broad and general exclusion. Because Congress felt it im-
possible to anticipate every potentially legitimate basis for a 
wage differential, it provided this inclusive exception.72 To prove 
67. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (Supp. II 1978) authorizes a wage differential if the employer 
can show it is based on "(i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which 
measures earnings by quantity or quality of production, or (iv) a differential based on 
any other factor other than sex ••.• n 
68. Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974); Brennan v. Victoria Bank 
& Trust Co., 493 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1974) (seniority system was legitimate basis for wage 
differentials between male and female bank tellers). 
69. For a further discussion of job evaluation techniques, see notes 187-199 infra 
and accompanying text. 
70. See generally cases cited note 68 supra. 
71. Hodgson v. Robert Hall Clothes, Inc., 473 F.2d 589 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 414 
U.S. 866 (1973) (pay differential between male and female sales persons justified because 
men sold more expensive merchandise). 
72. [The fourth defense] recognizes certain circumstances such as 
'red circle rates.' The term is borrowed from War Labor Board 
parlance and describes certain unusual higher than normal 
wage rates which are maintained for many valid reasons. For 
instance, it is not uncommon for an employer who must re-
duce help in a skilled job to transfer employees to other less 
demanding jobs but to continue to pay them a premium rate 
13
Lipsig: Equal Pay
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1981
814 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:801 
this exception applies, however, an employer may have to show 
what specific factor other than sex was determinative, and that 
the factor was accorded its proper weight in the determination 
of wages.73 
Remedies 
A court may assess both civil and criminal penalties for an 
Equal Pay Act violation. The standard remedy is an award of 
back pay, the difference between the wages paid the employee 
and what would have been paid absent the discrimination.7• In 
addition, the employee is entitled to attorney's fees,715 as well as 
liquidated damages,76 which are a fixed sum equal to the amount 
of back pay already awarded. Liquidated damages may be re-
duced or eliminated, however, if the employer can show he or 
she acted in good faith.77 Once liability is established, an em-
ployer may not lower rates for men, but must instead raise the 
in order to have them available when they are again needed 
for their former jobs. 
H.R. REP. No. 309, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1963] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 687, 689. 
It is interesting to note that the House Report also mentions "shift differentials, 
restrictions on or differences based on time of day worked, hours of work, lifting or mov-
ing of heavy objects" as things that they might consider as "factors other than sex." The 
courts have held that none of the factors listed above justify wage differentials under the 
Equal Pay Act. 
73. [I]f the difference in salaries paid is too great to be accounted 
for by the difference [in the asserted factor other than sex], 
then it would seem necessary to show some other factor other 
than sex as the basis for the unexplained portion of the wage 
differential before a conclusion that there is no wage discrimi-
nation based on sex would be warranted. 
29 C.F.R. § 800.143 (1980). 
74. "Any employer who violates the provisions of section 206 or section 207 of this 
[title] shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their un-
paid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation •... " 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) 
(Supp. II 1978). 
75. Id. "The employee is entitled to 'an additional •• .' amount [equal to their back 
pay] as liquidated damages." Id. This amounts to double damages. 
76.Id. 
77. Liquidated Damages: In any action ... to recover unpaid 
minimum wages, unpaid overtime compensation or liquidated 
damag~s, under the [FLSA], if the employer shows to the sat-
isfaction of the court that the act or omission giving rise to 
such action was in good faith and that he had reasonable 
grounds for believing that his act or omission was not a viola-
tion of the [FLSA], the court may, in its sound discretion, 
award no liquidated damages or award any amount thereof 
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wages paid to women to an equal amount.'18 In addition to a civil 
suit, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
may bring a criminal action against willful violators and may file 
for a preliminary injunction in district court to prevent continu-
ing violations. '19 
B. TITLE VII 
While most wage discrimination cases have been brought 
under the Equal Pay Act, a few plaintiffs have attempted to 
prove a violation of Title VII as well.80 Title VII prohibits sex 
discrimination by employers in matters concerning hiring and 
firing, compensation, conditions or privileges of employment, 
and in segregation or classification of employees or applicants.81 
Title VII's application is broader than that of the Equal Pay 
Act. While the Equal Pay Act requires equal skill, effort, respon-
sibility, and similar working conditions,82 Title VII generally 
prohibits all discrimination in compensation based on sex.8S As a 
result, several plaintiffs have attempted to use Title VII to es-
tablish a theory of comparable worth by which they seek to at-
tack wage discrimination. This theory would protect female em-
ployees not covered by the Equal Pay Act because their jobs are 
not substantially equal to jobs done by men, yet who nonethe-
less suffer from sex-based wage discrimination.84 
not to exceed the amount specified in section 216(b) of this 
title. 
29 U.S.C. § 260 (Supp. II 1978). 
78. "Provided, that an employer who is paying a wage rate differential in violation 
of this subsection shall not, in order to comply with the provisions of this subsection, 
reduce the wage rate of any employee." Id. § 206(d)(1). 
79. "Willful violations of the Act may be prosecuted criminally." 29 C.F.R. 
§ 800.166(c) (1980). "The [EEOC] may obtain a court injunction to restrain any person 
from violating the law, including the unlawful withholding by an employer of proper 
compensation." Id. § .166(b). 
80. See cases cited notes 4 & 9 supra. The prison employees in Gunther brought 
suit under Title VII because the Equal Pay Act did not apply to government employees 
during the period in question. Although the court recognized the validitY of job compari-
sons in limited situations, appellants actually argued that their jobs were substantially 
equal, as if proceeding under the Equal Pay Act, rather than under a theory of job com-
parability. Brief for Appellants at 22, Gunther v. County of Washington, 602 F.2d 852 
(9th Cir. 1979). 
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (Supp. II 1978). See note 2 supra, for full text. 
82. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (Supp. II 1978). 
83. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (Supp. II 1978). 
84. See generally cases cited note 4 supra. 
15
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The requisite burden of proof in a Title VII suit depends on 
the nature of the alleged violation. There are three basic types of 
Title VII violations. A plaintiff may allege the employer engaged 
in intentional discrimination, or, although not intentional, the 
employer's action or inaction resulted in either disparate treat-
ment of an individual, or in disparate impact on a class of 
individuals. 
Intentionally or facially discriminatory practices are prohib-
ited by Title VII. After a showing of discriminatory intent is 
made, the employer may attempt to raise the bona fide occupa-
tional qualification,811 the only defense to a charge of intentional 
discrimination. This defense allows employers to give preferen-
tial treatment in employment or classification of an individual 
based on gender "in instances where [gender] is a bona fide oc-
cupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal op-
eration of that particular business or enterprise."88 The bona 
fide occupational qualification has been narrowly construed by 
the courts and per1l}.itted only where certain sexual characteris-
tics are absolutely necessary.8'1 Because only intentionally dis-
criminatory practices give rise to a bona fide occupational quali-
fication, this defense has little relevance in comparable worth 
cases, where wage inequality is generally the result of a subtle 
evolution of job segregation. 
85. (e) Not withstanding any other provision of this subchapter: 
(1) it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an em-
ployer to hire and employ employees, for an employment 
agency to classify, or refer for employment any individual ... 
on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those 
certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a 
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary 
to the normal operation of that particular business or enter-
prise .... 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (Supp. II 1978). 
86. Id. For a detailed discussion of the BFOQ, see Comment, Title VII: Sex Dis-
crimination and a New Bona Fide Occupational Qualification-How Bona Fide?, 30 U. 
FLA. L. REV. 466 (1978). 
87. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (pregnant women may be excluded 
from stewardess positions); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th 
Cir. 1969) (strength requirements for "switchman" job did not constitute bona fide occu-
pational qualification); Rosenfield v. Southern Pacific Co. 444 F.2d 1218 (9th Cir. 1971) 
(heavy manual work required for trainyard worker not bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion). In Rosenfield, the court suggested that only jobs such as actor and actress, model, 
and wet nurse could satisfy the defense. 
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A Title VII violation may also be found where an employer's 
practices, while facially neutral, result in the discriminatory 
treatment of an individual. The formula for proof in such a case, 
as stated by the Supreme Court in McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. 
Green,88 puts the primary burden on the plaintiff to show prima 
facie discriminatory treatment. Plaintiff's burden includes a 
showing that plaintiff is a member of a group protected by Title 
VII and that she was denied an opportunity granted to others 
with equal qualifications.89 Once a prima facie showing is made, 
the burden shifts to the employer to show "some legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's [treatment].90 The 
plaintiff is then entitled to prove that the employer's ostensible 
reason for the disparate treatment was merely a pretext for sex 
discrimination. Because disparate treatment analysis applies 
only to individuals, wage discrimination suits are rarely brought 
under this theory.91 
Most compensation discrimination suits involve more than 
one plaintiff and may be appropriate for class actions,92 the 
third type of Title VII suit. Generally the plaintiffs will need to 
prove that their employer's neutral practices have a disparate 
impact on the class as a whole. In Griggs v. Duke Power,98 the 
Supreme Court held that proof of specific discriminatory intent 
was not required under Title VII, but would be inferred from a 
showing of disparate impact.~ The Court found that "Congress 
directed the thrust of [Title VII] to the consequences of employ-
ment practices, not simply the motivation. "915 
A prima facie case under this theory begins with a showing 
of disparate impact on plaintiffs as a class. This is usually done 
88. 411 u.s. 792 (1973). 
89. Id. at 802. 
90.Id. 
91. Nevertheless, the McDonnell-Douglas formula was intended to be flexible and 
could be applied to a compensation suit. In that case the plaintiff might have to show 1) 
that 8he was a member of a group protected by Title VIT, 2) that her qualifications and 
job requirements were comparable to workers in other areas, 3) that despite her worth, 
she was paid less than other workers, and 4) the other workers were not members of the 
class. 
92. Class actions brought under Title VIT must comply with Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). 
93. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
94.Id. 
95. Id. at 432. 
17
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with statistical evidence that illustrates a numerical disparity 
between members of the plaintiffs' class and other groups in the 
desired position.98 A showing of a disproportionate impact on a 
class creates a rebuttable presumption of a Title VII violation. 
Thus, if no women are selected on a job for which there were 
numerous female applicants, the court will find an inference of 
illegality. The burden then shifts to the employer to raise the 
business necessity defense. 
The business necessity defense places "on the employer the 
burden of showing that any given [job] requirement must have a 
manifest relationship to the employment in question."9? Proof of 
a manifest relationship will depend on the nature of the chal-
lenged practice. Generally, an employer must show there was an 
overriding, legitimate business purpose behind the practice and 
that the practice is necessary to the safe and efficient operation 
of the business.98 Once the employer shows sufficient "job relat-
edness" of the practice, the employees are given an opportunity 
to prove the existence of a less discriminatory alternative.99 If 
such an alternative exists, the employer's business necessity de-
fense will fail. 
Damages 
In a Title VII suit, a successful plaintiff is entitled to back 
pay and attorney's fees;loo generally no punitive or exemplary 
damages will be awarded.101 The court may grant a preliminary 
injunction if the plaintiff shows a probability of success on the 
merits and proof of irreparable harm.102 
96. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), in which plaintiffs 
asserted that an employment test discriminated against blacks. A prima facie case con-
sisted of proof that "the tests in question select applicants for hire or promotion in a 
racial pattern significantly different from that of the pool of applicants." Id. at 409. 
97. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 436. 
98. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321. (1977). 
99.Id. 
100. "If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in . • . an 
unlawful employment practice. • . the court may enjoin respondent. . • and order such 
affirmative action as may be appropriate .... " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. II 1978). 
101. Id. Although the statute generally does not provide for an award of punitive 
damages, they have occasionally been granted. See Dessenberg v. American Metal Form-
ing Co., 6 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 5460 (N.D. Ohio 1973). 
102. "If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is inten-
tionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the 
court may enjoin respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice 
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C. EQuAL PAY ACT vs. TITLE VII 
Often a plaintiff will need to elect between suing under the 
Equal Pay Act and suing under Title VII. Each puts a heavy 
burden on the plaintiff. Even where a plaintiff can meet the sub-
stantially equal requirement of the Equal Pay Act/oS the em-
ployer has a variety of available defenses. 1M In a Title VII suit, 
the plaintiff has more options for proving a case, ranging from 
proof of discriminatory intent to mere proof of disparate impact. 
The court has not yet enunciated the requisite burden of proof 
for a Title VII wage discrimination suit, but the disparate im-
pact formula may apply. One final benefit of an Equal Pay Act 
suit, however, is the availability of a larger award, including 
back pay and double damages.105 
III. THE BENNETT AMENDMENT CONTRO-
VERSY-THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE EQUAL PAY 
ACT AND TITLE VII 
Because Title VII prohibits discriminatory compensation 
based on sex, courts have experienced difficUlty determining its 
proper construction in relationship to the Equal Pay Act. Confu-
sion has been heightened by the Bennett Amendment to Title 
VII,106 which states: "It shall not be an unlawful employment 
practice under this subchapter for any employer to differentiate 
upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of wages or 
compensation paid employees of such employer if such differen-
tiation is authorized by the provisions of [the Equal Pay Act]." 
Two interpretations of the Amendment have emerged dur-
ing recent litigation.10'1 Both address the same question: how 
.•.. " 42 u.s.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. II 1978). 
103. For a discussion of the Equal Pay Act, see notes 53-66 supra and accompanying 
text. 
104. Defenses are discussed at notes 67-73 supra and accompanying text. 
105. For an explanation of remedies, see notes 74-79 supra and accompanying text. 
106. The amendment, found at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (Supp. II 1978), was named 
for its author, Republican Senator Bennett of Utah. 
107. The Fifth and Tenth Circuits held, in Lemons v. City of Denver, 620 F.2d 228 
(10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 244 (1980); Orr v. MacNeill & Son, Inc., 511 
F.2d 166 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975); and Ammons v. Zia, 448 F.2d 117 
(10th Cir. 1971), that a compensation discrimination claim under Title VII must meet 
the requirements of the Equal Pay Act. The Third and Ninth Circuits have held that the 
Bennett Amendment only incorporates the Equal Pay Act's defenses into Title VII and 
therefore allows a claim of wage discrimination without an allegation of equal work. IUE 
19
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much of the Equal Pay Act is incorporated into Title VII 
through the Bennett Amendment? One view maintains that 
wage discrimination suits brought under Title VII must comply 
with all the requirements of the Equal Pay Act;I08 the other 
holds that only the defenses enumerated in the Equal Pay Act 
are available to an employer charged with wage discrimination 
under Title VILlo9 The first interpretation requires a showing of 
job equality in all compensation discrimination suits; the latter 
is more flexible and may allow a plaintiff to prove discrimination 
where the jobs are merely comparable. 
A. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
The interpretation favored by the Tenth and Fifth Circuits 
limits Title VII wage discrimination suits to situations in which 
the jobs are substantially equal according to the Equal Pay Act 
standards.llo In Ammons v. Zia, III the Tenth Circuit held that 
the Equal Pay Act and the Title VII compensation provisions 
are in pari materia and must therefore be construed in harmony 
with each other.lls The court made no Bennett Amendment 
analysis and concluded that the plaintiff must prove the jobs in 
question were "substantially equal" to make a prima facie show-
ing of discrimination under Title VII.lls 
The Ammons court assumed applicability of the in pari 
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980); Gunther v. County of Wash-
ington, 602 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1979), rehearing denied, 623 F.2d 1303 (1980), aft'd, 49 
U.S.L.W. 4623 (U.S. June 8, 1981). 
108. Lemons v. City of Denver, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. 
Ct. 244 (1980); Orr v. MacNeill & Son, Inc., 511 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 
U.S. 865 (1975); Ammons v. Zia, 448 F.2d 117 (10th Cir. 1971). 
109. IDE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980); Gunther v. 
County of Washington, 602 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1979), rehearing denied, 623 F.2d 1303 
(1980), aft'd, 49 U.S.L.W. 4623 (U.S. June 8, 1981). 
110. A successful Equal Pay Act claim requires that the jobs in question involve 
tI equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and that they be performed under similar working 
conditions. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1978). 
111. 448 F.2d 117 (10th Cir. 1971). Plaintiff failed both to show that the denial of 
Apollo test site clearance granted to male employees would have entitled her to higher 
pay, and that she was performing work equal to that done by higher paid males. 
112. ld. at 119 (quoting Shultz v. Wheaton Glass, 421 F.2d 259, 266 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970». Many other courts have agreed that the two statutes are in 
pari materia; see Orr v. MacNeill & Son, Inc., 511 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 423 
U.S. 865 (1975); Cullari v. East-West Gateway, 457 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Mo. 1978); Di-
salvo v. Chamber of Commerce, 416 F. Supp. 844 (W.D. Mo. 1976). 
113. 448 F.2d 117, 120 (10th Cir. 1971). 
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materia doctrine to Title VII and the Equal Pay Act; other 
courts have given it similar summary treatment.ll4 Generally, 
statutes are held to be in pari materia when they pertain to the 
same subject matter or were enacted with the same purpose in 
mind, and as such, are construed as one body of law, giving ef-
fect to every provision in each statute.UII The Ammons court 
presumably relied on the doctrine as it applies to general and 
special statutes, which provides that when one statute specifies 
procedures or subjects touched upon in a broader statute, the 
specialized statute controls.u6 
The Third Circuit declined to apply the in pari materia 
doctrine in IUE v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.u7 and stated 
that "it is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's caution that 
remedies for employment discrimination 'supplement' each 
other and should not be construed so as to ignore the differences 
among them."118 This interpretation implies that the Equal Pay 
Act and Title VII have important differences and that each act 
should increase, and not denigrate, the protections offered by 
the other. 
The Bennett Amendment gives force to the in pari materia 
argument and indicates that Congress, aware that confusion over 
statutory construction might arise, enacted Title VII with the 
Equal Pay Act in mind. Unfortunately, the language of the 
114. See cases cited note 112 supra. 
115. 2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51.02 (4th ed. 1973). 
In terms of legislative intent, it is assumed that whenever 
the legislature enacts a provision it has in mind previous stat-
utes relating to the same subject matter, wherefore it is held 
that in the absence of any express repeal or amendment 
therein, the new provision was enacted in accord with the leg-
islative policy embodied in those prior statutes, and they 
should all be construed together. 
• • • Prior statutes relating to the same subject matter are 
to be compared with the new provision; and if possible by rea-
sonable construction, both are to be so construed that effect is 
given to every provision of all of them. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
116. This is suggested by the Third Circuit's discussion of Westinghouse's allega-
tions in WE v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980):" 'Where there is 
no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a 
general one, regardless of priority of enactment.' " Id. at 1101 (quoting Radzanower v. 
Touche, Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153 (1976». See C. SANDS, note 115 supra, § 15.05. 
117. 631 F.2d 1094, 1101 (3d Cir. 1980). 
118. Id. (citing Alexander v. Gardener-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48 n.9 (1974». 
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Amendment is ambiguous and vague as to what is specifically 
allowed under Title VII. Courts holding that the Equal Pay Act 
completely controls wage discrimination suits under Title VII 
have consistently avoided a discussion of statutory language and 
construction, giving no legal basis for their conclusions beyond 
the bare citation of the statute and amendment.U9 
The Ninth and Third Circuits, on the other hand, have 
closely examined the language of the statutes to reach a differ-
ent interpretation of the Amendment.120 Although the Bennett 
Amendment allows a wage differential if it is authorized by the 
provisions of the Equal Pay Act, the only differentials expressly 
authorized are those based on the four enumerated defenses.121 
In Gunther v. County of Washington,122 the Ninth Circuit 
stated: 
The Equal Pay Act applies only when a plaintiff 
has been denied equal pay for equal work, and 
authorizes a differentiation only where one of the 
four defenses is invoked. The Equal Pay Act does 
not "authorize" differentiations in the absence of 
equal work; in those cases it simply does not ap-
ply. Read literally, the amendment only incorpo-
rates the Equal Pay Act's defenses. If Congress 
had intended to say that wage differentials do not 
119. In Ammons, the Tenth Circuit concluded that "to prove a case of discrimina-
tion under Title VIT, one must prove a differential in pay based on sex for performing 
equal work." 448 F.2d at 120. The court cited no authority for this proposition beyond 
the provisions of the Equal Pay Act. Citing Ammons, the Fifth Circuit, in Orr v. 
MacNeill & Son, Inc., 511 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975), found 
that any wage differential authorized under the Equal Pay Act is not unlawful under 
Title VII. A more recent Tenth Circuit case also approved Ammons. In Lemons v. City 
of Denver, 620 F.2d 225 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 244 (1980), city-em-
ployed nurses contended that the city's wage scheme, based on the community wage 
scale, discriminated against women in violation of Title VII. The court stated: "The Ben-
nett Amendment is generally considered to have the equal pay/work concept apply to 
Title VII in the same way as it applies in the Equal Pay Act." ld. at 229-30 (emphasis 
added). 
120. Gunther v. County of Washington, 602 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1979), rehearing de-
nied, 623 F.2d 1303 (1980), aft'd, 49 U.S.L.W. 4623 (U.S. June 8, 1981). IUE v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980). This interpretation is also supported by 
dictum in Manhart v. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Power & Water, 553 F.2d 581, 590 
(9th Cir.), aft'd in part and rev'd in part, 435 U.S. 702 (1978). 
121. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (Supp. II 1978). 
122. 602 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1979), rehearing denied, 623 F.2d 1303 (1980), aft'd, 49 
U.S.L.W. 4623 (U.S. June 8, 1981). For a discussion of the opinion issued on rehearing, 
see text accompanying note 170 infra. 
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violate Title VII unless they violate the Equal 
Pay Act, it could have easily said SO.123 
823 
The Third Circuit approved the Gunther interpretation in IUE 
v. Westinghouse Corp. defining the term "authorized" as 
describing something endorsed or expressly permitted, rather 
than merely something not prohibited.123.1 The IUE court also 
recognized a well-established rule of construction, somewhat the 
converse of in pari materia, which states that when two statutes 
concern the same subject matter but one contains additional 
provisions not included in the other, the omission of the provi-
sions indicates different intentions behind the two statutes.124 
Title VII does not expressly require equal work in compensation 
suits, whereas the Equal Pay Act includes the "substantially 
equal" requirement. According to the Third Circuit's reasoning, 
the omission of the "substantially equal" provision from Title 
VII indicates a congressional intent to allow a broader applica-
tion than is possible under the Equal Pay Act. This interpreta-
tion is reinforced by the chronological aspect of the statutory 
history. The Equal Pay Act was an initial, narrow and highly 
focused piece of legislation, while Title VII was a strong, broad 
statement of policy to be implemented as necessary for maxi-
mum enforcement. 
B. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE BENNETT AMENDMENT 
The scanty legislative history accompanying the Bennett 
Amendment reveals little about the purpose for including the 
Amendment in Title VII.12~ While introducing the Amendment, 
Senator Bennett stated his personal intent that "[in] the event 
123. 623 F.2d at 1319. This view is also supported by dictum in Laffey v. Northwest 
Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978). 
123.1 631 F.2d at 1101. 
124. 631 F.2d at 1101. This argument is also made in Gunther; see discussion at 
note 120 supra. 
125. The legislative materials on the Bennett Amendment are re-
markable only for their equivocacy and turbidity. As has oft 
been noted, sex was added as a protected classification late in 
the debate on the Civil Rights Act. • . . The Amendment was 
not part of the [Act] when it had first passed the House and 
was sent to the Senate, although the Act at that time included 
the prohibition against sex discrimination. The amendment 
was included later on on the floor of the House after cloture 
and was adopted following a very brief colloquoy. 
[d. at 1101-02. 
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of conflicts, the provisions of the Equal Pay Act shall not be 
nullified. "126 The Fifth and Tenth Circuits chose not to discuss 
the legislative history of the Bennett Amendment,127 while both 
the Ninth and Third Circuits relied on the congressional record 
in their decisions.128 The Ninth and Third Circuits concluded 
that the remarks of Senator Dirksen, that "the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act carries out certain exceptions, and . . . [a]II that the 
pending amendment does is recognize those exceptions that are 
carried in the basic act,"129 combined with those of Senator Ben-
nett, indicate an intent to incorporate only the four Equal Pay 
Act defenses into Title VII.130 
126. The legislative record reads: 
MR. BENNETI: Mr. President, after many years of yearning 
by members of the fair sex in this country, after very careful 
study by the appropriate committees of Congress, last year 
Congress passed the so-called Equal Pay Act, which became 
effective only yesterday. 
By this time programs have been established for the effec-
tive administration of this Act. Now, when the Civil Rights 
bill is under consideration, in which the word 'sex' has been 
inserted in many places, I do not believe sufficient attention 
may have been paid to possible conflicts between the whole-
sale insertion of the word 'sex' in the bill and the Equal Pay 
Act. 
The purpose of my amendment is to provide that in the 
event of conflicts, the provisions of the Equal Pay Act shall 
not be nullified. 
MR. HUMPHREY: The amendment of the Senator from 
Utah is helpful. I believe it is needed. I thank him for his 
thoughtfulness. The amendment is fully acceptable. 
MR. DIRKSEN: Mr. President, I yield myself 1 minute. 
We were aware of the conflict that might develop, because 
the Equal Pay Act is an amendment to the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act. The Fair Labor Standards Act carries out certain 
exceptions. 
All that the pending amendment does is recogni2e those 
exceptions, that are carried in the basic act. 
Therefore, this amendment is necessary in the interest of 
clarification. 
110 CONGo REc. 13647 (1964). 
127. See cases cited note 119 supra. 
128. See cases cited note 120 supra. 
129. See note 126 supra. 
130. See cases cited note 120 supra. Senator Dirksen's statement refers to excep-
tions; the Equal Pay Act's exceptions are its four defenses. Because no circuit reaching 
an opposite conclusion has discussed legislative history, it is impossible to determine 
what their interpretation would have been. Arguments posed by Judge Van Dusen in his 
JUE dissent present a contradictory view of legislative history, but the interpretation is 
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Attempting to controvert this conclusion, defendants in 
IUE and Gunther1S1 introduced two documents. The first was a 
portion of the legislative record showing a pre-enactment ques-
tion and answer session which occurred two months before the 
proposal of the Bennett Amendment, just after the word "sex" 
was added to Title VII.1s2 The exchange focused on the fact that 
Title VII does not include the equal work requirements present 
in the Equal Pay Act, and on how the two acts were to be recon-
ciled. In response, Senator Clark concluded that the standards 
set out in the Equal Pay Act apply to the "comparable situa-
tion" under Title VII.1sS While Senator Clark's response cannot 
clarify the Bennett Amendment, as it had not yet been written, 
it does show a congressional concern over the relationship be-
tween the two acts. 
The Ninth Circuit used Senator Clark's answer to reinforce 
its holding. When plaintiffs allege equal work, yet base their 
claim on a violation of Title VII, it is a "comparable situation" 
unsupported. Summarizing Senator Bennett's statement, supra note 126, Judge Van Du-
sen remarked: 
[The] statement is open to different interpretations because 
Senator Bennett did not specify the provisions of the Equal 
Pay Act to which he was referring. I believe, however, the 
most logical interpretation of the statement is that Senator 
Bennett was referring to the equal work provisions of the 
Equal Pay Act. 
631 F.2d at 112-13 (Van Dusen, J., dissenting). 
131. The Ninth Circuit panel issued a second opinion in Gunther, after a petition 
for rehearing was filed by the County of Washington. The court discussed additional 
documents that were submitted at that time. 623 F.2d 1303, 1317 (9th Cir. 1979). 
132. The objection was raised by Senator Dirksen and answered by Senator Clark: 
Objection: The sex antidiscrimination provisions of the 
bill duplicate the coverage of the Equal Pay Act of 1963. But 
more than this, they extend far beyond the scope and coverage 
of the Equal Pay Act. They do not include the limitations in 
that act with respect to equal work on jobs requiring equal 
skills in the same establishments, and thus, cut across differ-
ent jobs. 
Answer: The Equal Pay Act is a part of the wage hour 
law, with different coverage and numerous exemptions than 
those under Title VII. Furthermore, under Title VII, jobs can 
no longer be classified as to sex, except where there is a ra-
tional basis for discrimination on the ground of a bona fide 
occupational qualification. The standards in the Equal Pay 
Act for determining discrimination as to wages, of course, are 
applicable to the comparable situation under Title VII. 
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to an Equal Pay Act claim and, therefore, Equal Pay Act stan-
dards must be applied. Absent a claim of equal work, however, 
the alleged discriminatory conduct must be analyzed und,er Title 
VII, which requires no showing of job equality. Although the 
Third Circuit acknowledged a different interpretation was plau-
sible,ls4 it ultimately agreed with the Gunther COurt.1S5 
The second document submitted by defendants in IUE and 
Gunther constitutes ex post facto legislative history. One year 
after Title VII, in an attempt to clarify the growing confusion 
surrounding the interpretation of the Amendment/se Senator 
Bennett inserted the following statement into the record: "If the 
Bennett Amendment is to be given any effect, it must be inter-
preted to mean that discrimination in compensation on account 
of sex does not violate Title VII unless it also violates the Equal 
Pay Act."IS7 In considering the statement, the Gunther court 
stated: 
Either from a legal standpoint or as a practical 
m~tter, Senator Bennett's statement cannot ex-
press what was on Congress' collective mind when 
it acted a year earlier. If Senator Bennett's "clari-
fying" statement has any significance, it must be 
as evidence that the amendment was ambiguous 
on its face and its contemporaneous legislative 
134. This interpretation is also acknowledged by the Fifth and Tenth Circuits. See 
cases cited note 119 supra. 
135. IUE, 631 F.2d at 1107. 
136. Senator Bennett cited the time pressure on Congress during the original de-
bates as the reason for this later addition'to the record. He explained: "As an example of 
what has occurred because of the confusion and near chaos that prevailed on those days, 
I find myself today under the necessity of trying to create legislative history that should 
have been created then." 111 CONGo REC. 13359 (1965). 
Id. 
137. Section 6(d) authorizes ..• 
1. Wage differentials on equal jobs made pursuant to (i) a se-
niority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which mea-
sures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a 
differential based on any other factor other than sex. 
The amendment therefore means that it is not an unlaw-
ful employment practice; ••• (b) to have different standards 
of compensation for nonexempt employees where such differ-
entiation is not prohibited by the equal pay amendment to the 
Fair Labor Standards Act. , 
Simply stated, the amendment means that discrimination 
in compensation on 'account of sex does not violate Title VII 
unless it also violates the Equal Pay Act. 
Women's Law Forum 
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history was not enlightening. ISS 
In IUE, the Third Circuit looked also to EEOC regulations 
to define the relationship of the Equal Pay Act to Title VII. It 
found the EEOC favors an expansive interpretation of Title 
VII.ls9 Regulations specify that, while the Equal Pay Act is con-
trolling in situations where both statutes apply, Title VII is not 
necessarily limited by the provisions of the Equal Pay Act.HO 
The IUE court reasoned that the Equal Pay Act applies only 
when a claim of equal work is made; barring such a claim, Title 
VII controls in wage discrimination cases. In 
One issue which has been largely ignored by the courts is 
the overall effect of the two possible interpretations of the Ben-
nett Amendment on Title VII. The courts have not yet discussed 
the practical application of the Equal Pay Act defenses to Title 
VII. Nor have the courts considered whether the Bennett 
Amendment restricts an employer's defenses in a Title VII com-
138. 623 F.2d at 1318. 
In IUE, the Third Circuit followed Gunther, but Judge Van Dusen's dissent gave 
great weight to postenactment comments by legislators. In Sioux Tribe v. United States, . 
316 U.S. 317 (1942), the court held that a statement by a member of the drafting com-
mittee of an act made five years after the statute was passed was "conclusive" as to the 
meaning of the statute. In Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1953), cited by both the major-
ity and the dissent in IUE, the court upheld the deportation of a Mexican alien for 
membership in the Communist Party, even though he proved that he was unaware they 
advocated violence against the government. A 1951 amendment to the Internal Security 
Act of 1950 excluded those who were duped into joining the Party from the definition of 
"member." During the debate over the amendment, however, several members of Con-
gress claimed that, even with the amendment, the word member would be given the 
same meaning as in the original statute. 
Galvan may be distinguished from the cases involving the Bennett Amendment be-
cause the statements made in Galvan are part of the contemporaneous legislative history 
of the amendment in question, having been made during the congressional debates. The 
memorandum by Senator Bennett was not part of the debate and is therefore not 
contemporaneous. 
139. See Decision No. 70-112, [1973] EEOC Dec. (CCH) 116108 (1969); Decision No. 
70-0695, [1973] EEOC Dec. (CCH) 11 6148 (1970). 
140. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.8 (1980) provides: 
Relationship of Title VII to the Equal Pay Act. 
(a) The employee coverage of the prohibitions against dis-
crimination based on sex contained in Title VII is coextensive 
with that of other prohibitions contained in Title VII and is 
not limited by [the Bennett Amendment] to those employees 
covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act. 
(b) By virtue of [the Bennett Amendment], a defense 
based on the Equal Pay Act may be raised in a proceeding 
under Title VII. 
141. 631 F.2d at 1106. 
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pensation suit to only those defenses enumerated in the Equal 
Pay Act, or whether it also allows the employer to raise Title VII 
defenses as well. 
If the Bennett Amendment is determined to incorporate en-
tirely Title VII's compensation provisions into the Equal Pay 
Act, then it would seem that regular Title VII defenses should 
not be allowed. On the other hand, if all the Bennett Amend-
ment does is permit an employer to raise Equal Pay Act de-
fenses in response to a wage discrimination charge under Title 
VII, then perhaps they may be raised in addition to the usual 
Title VII defenses. It is important to note that the bona fide 
occupational qualification only applies to charges of facial or in-
tentional discrimination and thus would not often arise in a 
comparable worth situation. Business necessity, however, may be 
raised to counter a charge of disparate impact. Such a defense 
would be difficult to establish in a compensation case, however, 
unless the court were willing to accept mere econOInic necessity, 
which they have not yet done. 
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPARABLE WORTH IN 
THE COURTS 
Courts are gradually acknowledging and reviewing the the-
ory that women should be paid according to the value of their 
work rather than by extrinsic, stereotypic standards. No court 
has yet fully accepted a legal application of the theory of compa-
rable worth, and the Supreme Court's decision in Gunther side-
stepped the issue. The basis for judicial acceptance or rejection 
of a comparable worth standard, however, lies outside the realm 
of the Courts. Some courts have gone beyond mere statutory con-
struction to consider economic questions which underlie the le-
gal issues.142 Decisions based on economic principles, however, 
are not always just, and may be heavily influenced by the power 
of business interests. As is indicated by the cases discussed be-
low, these interests, and how much weight the courts choose to 
grant them, provide the ultimate basis for most decisions in this 
area. 
142. See cases cited note 4 supra. 
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A. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL PAY ACT 
The controversy surrounding the Bennett Amendment and 
the interpretation of Title VII has led several courts to go be-
yond rules of construction into the hazy area.of legislative in-
tent. Because there is no relevant record concerning the compen-
sation provisions of Title VII, courts have based their decisions 
on interpretations of the congressional intent of the Equal Pay 
Act and have formulated a strong argument against the equal 
pay for comparable worth concept because of the economic bur-
den involved.14s 
The congressional record reveals that an early version of the 
Equal Pay Act mandated equal pay for work of a "comparable 
character," rather than equal pay for equal work.14<l This lan-
guage was modified to its current form after some debate in the 
House of Representatives. The major proponent of the modifica-
tion, Representative St. George, argued that women wanted 
nothing less than absolute equality. She believed that a compa-
rable standard would lessen, rather than increase, the chances of 
equality for women in the same way that protective legislation 
may further discrimination against women by fostering stereo-
typic responses and attitudes.1<l5 
Proponents of the comparable worth standard argued that 
an equality standard would often be impossible to prove and 
would impose an undue hardship on women. One House member 
argued that the equal work standard failed to address the prob-
lem of job segregation and would, in fact, leave many women 
unprotected.146 The House nevertheless adopted the more re-
143. Lemons v. City of Denver, 620 F.2d 228 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 244 
(1980); Orr v. MacNeill & Son, Inc., 511 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 865 
(1975). 
144. The original provision tinder consideration was: "Employers must pay equal 
wages to employees doing comparable work, the performance of which requires compara-
ble skill." 108 CONGo REc. 14754 (1962). 
145. Representative St. George (R. New York) remarked: "As a woman, I do not 
particularly want to be compared to a man ••.. " 108 CONGo RBc. 14768 (1962). 
She also believed that, under a comparable standard, quality of work could be com-
pared, which might lead to further discrimination against women doing equal work. ld. 
at 14767. 
146. Representative Stratton (D. New York) offered the following prediction which 
indeed has come to pass: 
[What if] we were confronted with a situation in Gloversville, 
for example, where we have people sewing knitted gloves in 
29
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strictive version. The Fifth and Tenth Circuits have used this 
record to show that Congress intended to deny application of a 
comparable worth standard in all wage discrimination suits.147 In 
Lemons v. City of Denver,148 the Tenth Circuit, citing the Con-
gressional Record, focused on the economic implications of com-
paring entirely different jobs.149 The economic and business as-
pects of the comparable standard were raised only once during 
the House discussion concerning modification of the Equal Pay 
Act, when it was argued that "comparable" was too vague for 
businesses to apply consistently.u50 
It appears from the record that the congressional motive for 
the modification from comparable to equal was chiefly one of 
concern for women. While the difficulty of enforcing a compara-
ble standard was noted, the House did not expressly dismiss the 
standard. Representative St. George's arguments were basically 
philosophical, but it seems that a majority of House members 
credited her opinion, because she was a woman, as representing 
the best economic interests of all women. If, as the record indi-
cates, the House based its decision on a desire to offer the widest 
protection possible, one must conclude they did not intend to 
conclusively exclude a theory of comparable worth, or any other 
one bUilding and sewing leather gloves in another, [I wonder] 
whether under [Mrs. St. George's] amendment, it may not 
turn out this is not equal work .... [W]ould it not be easy for 
an employer to argue in such cases that these operations were 
not equal, so if all of those sewing knitted gloves happened to 
be women and all of those sewing leather gloves happened to 
be men, might it not be possible. . . for an employer to evade 
the clear intent of Congress in passing this legislation? 
108 CONGo REc. 14771 (1962). 
147. See cases cited note 143 supra. In Orr, the court cited an Equal Pay Act case, 
Brennan V. City Stores, 479 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1973), which held that Congress substi-
tuted the word equal for the word comparable to require that the jobs involved be virtu-
ally identical. 
148. 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 244 (1980). 
149. See notes 159-172 infra and accompanying text. 
150. Representative Landrum (D. Georgia) raised this argument: 
If, in fact, we want to establish equal pay for equal work, then 
we ought to say so and not permit the trooping around all over 
the country of employees of the Labor Department harassing 
business with their various interpretations of the term "com-
parable" when "equal" is capable of the same definition 
throughout the United States. 
108 CONGo REc. 14767-68 (1962). 
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theory which would help end employment discrimination against 
women. 
B. ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF COMPARABLE WORTH 
Perhaps the best argument against a theory of equal pay for 
comparable work is the potential economic impact it would have 
on businesses.1II1 Several courts have held that Title VII is not 
intended to remedy discrimination if to do so would require al-
tering the economic structure of the marketplace.11l2 
In Christensen v. Iowa/liS female clerical workers sued their 
employer, the university, alleging wage discrimination under Ti-
tle VII. They sought to compare the work of the exclusivelY fe-
male clerical stafflll4 with the work of the predominantly male 
physical plant workers.lllll The university set wages by giving 
each job a point value and matching salaries to points ac-
crued.11l6 But because physical plant workers in the local job 
market received wages higher than those assigned by the univer-
151. Smith, The EEOC's Bold Foray into Job Evaluation, FORTUNE, Sept. 11, 1978, 
at 59, portrays the economic effect of requiring a comparable worth standard for wage 
determination: 
[A comparable worth requirement] would certainly cor-
rect imbalances rapidly, but the economy would surely be 
much disrupted in the process. At the extreme, to raise the 
aggregate pay of the country's 27.3 million full-time working 
women high enough so that the median pay for women would 
equal that of men would add a staggering $150 billion a year 
to civilian payrolls. Such a radical step, of course seems too 
preposterious to be taken seriously. But even partial measures 
-a more likely bet-would have enormous impact, undoubt-
edly aggravated by demands from unioni2ed workers in tradi-
tionally male jobs that their pay be increased cor-
respondingly." 
152. Lemons v. City of Denver, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 244 
(1980); Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977). 
153. 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977). 
154. The clerical staff included the following positions: account clerk, key entry op-
erator, data technician, typist, secretary, and mail clerk. Id. at 354 n.3. 
155. The physical plant workers included carpet layers, mail carriers, tree trimmers, 
parking enforcement officers, bus drivers, electricians, locksmiths, upholsterers, mechan-
ics, plasterers, carpenters, and plumbers. Id. 
156. This is a frequently used method of job evaluation. A typist position, for exam-
ple, will be broken into certain factors such as skill required, amount of supervision nec-
essary, etc. For each factor, the job will receive points, depending on the degree to which 
the factor figures in the job. Points are tallied and jobs with equal points are assigned 
the same range of wages. For a further discussion of job evaluation techniques, see notes 
189-212 infra and accompanying text. 
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sity, the university raised the physical plant workers' pay to 
equal the community pay scale.I57 The university's compensa-
tion scheme, although ostensibly an attempt to equalize wage 
differentials, broke down because of the alleged need to compete 
with the local market, whose practices discriminated against wo-
men. The Eighth Circuit found appellants had not established a 
prima facie case for sex discrimination under Title VII because 
they did not adequately demonstrate that the wage differential 
between clerical workers and physical plant workers was based 
on the employer's discriminatory practices. In addition, the 
court held the university's dependence on the local labor market 
was sufficient reason for the wage differential.I5s 
The Christensen court refused to extend Title VII to an 
area it believed to be outside of the scope of equal opportunity 
as defined by the Supreme COurt.I59 Appellants argued the uni-
versity was liable because it was perpetuating the discrimination 
found in the community. The Eighth Circuit responded: 
Equality of opportunity is not at issue here. . . . 
Appellants' theory ignores economic realities. The 
value of the job to the employer represents but 
one factor affecting wages. Other factors may in-
clude the supply of workers willing to do the job 
and the ability of workers to band together to 
bargain collectively for higher wages. We find 
nothing in the text and history of Title VII sug-
gesting that Congress intended to abrogate the 
laws of supply and demand or other economic 
principles that determine wage rates for various 
kinds of work. We do not interpret Title VII as 
157. 563 F.2d at 354. 
158. [d. Because appellants did not establish a prima facie case, the court found it 
unnecessary to confront the Bennett Amendment. 
By way of distinction to the facts presented in this case, 
we might note that if the record had established that the Uni-
versity relied upon prevailing community wage rates in setting 
pay scales for male-dominated jobs but paid less than commu-
nity wages for jobs primarily staffed by women, we would nec-
essarily reach the Bennett Amendment issue. 
Id. at 355 n.6. 
159. "What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary and unnec-
essary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on 
the basis of racial or other impermissible classifications." 563 F.2d at 356 (quoting Griggs 
v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424 (1971». 
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requiring an employer to ignore the market in set-
ting wage rates for genuinely different work 
classifications. leo 
833 
Crucial to the court's decision was the notion that an employer 
should not be liable for perpetuating prevailing discriminatory 
community practices. The court did not believe that Title VII 
allows judicial regulation of the marketplace to the extent of 
forcing an employer, not guilty of any direct, overt discrimina-
tion, to pay for the wrongs of society as a whole. But application 
of Title VII to wage discrimination, discharge, or hiring prac-
tices, indeed requires an employer to guarantee that the particu-
lar wrongs of society are corrected. Even more so, quotas, special 
opportunity programs, and affirmative action, all potentially af-
fect the innocent business operator, entrepreneur, or person who 
has never engaged in any intentional discrimination. 
In Lemons, the Tenth Circuit held that the court does not 
have the power to interrupt the normal operation of the market-
place. In Lemons, city nurses sued the city because they felt 
their wage scale, which reflected that of the local job market, 
under-valued nurses and nursing as a traditional woman's job.lsl 
Citing Christensen, the court held that under existing law courts 
could not require an employer who had acted in good faith to re-
evaluate the worth of each job in relation to other jobs, espe-
cially when this would disregard the community job market.lss 
The court stated that comparisons between jobs requiring en-
tirely different skills would "be a whole new world for the courts 
and until some better signal from Congress is received we cannot 
venture into it."16S 
C. GUNTHER v. COUNTY OF WASHINGTON 
In two recent cases, the Ninth and Third Circuits have ven-
160. ld. (footnote omitted). 
161. The court did recognize the issue: 
The relationship of pay for nurses to pay for other positions is 
obviously the product of past attitudes, practices, and perhaps 
of supply and demand. The record shows that it becanle a part 
of the economic balance and relationships prevailing in the 
community among the myriad of positions in the job market. 
620 F.2d at 229. 
162. ld. at 230. 
163. ld. at 229. 
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tured into the "new world" of comparable worth. Gunther v. 
County of Washington164, was the first case in which any circuit 
has held a claim of wage discrimination need not mirror an 
Equal Pay Act claim. The plaintiffs in Gunther were four wo-
men matrons at the county jail, assigned to guard female prison-
ers. Male guards were paid a higher wage than the matrons for 
guarding male prisoners. The plaintiffs sued under Title VII, al-
leging unequal pay for equal work, and retaliatory discharge.1611 
Finding plaintiffs' work not substantially equal to that of the 
male guards, the district court ruled for the county. On appeal, 
in addition to their equal pay claim under Title VII, plaintiffs 
asserted that even if they did not perform substantially equal 
work, at least some of the discrepancy in pay could only be ex-
plained by sex discrimination.166 
The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's finding that 
the matron's work differed from that of the male guards, but 
further held that job equality is not necessarily determinative in 
compensation discrimination cases.16'1 After reviewing the legis-
lative history of the Bennett Amendment, and the language of 
the Equal Pay Act and Title VII, the panel concluded that Title 
VII is broader than the Equal Pay Act. "If we were to limit Title 
VII's protection against sexually discriminatory compensation 
practices to those covered by the Equal Pay Act, we would in 
effect insulate other equally harmful discriminatory practices 
from review.m6s 
The appellants' allegation of "other discriminatory prac-
tices" proved essential to the court's ruling: 
[A]lthough decisions interpreting the Equal Pay 
164. 602 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1979), rehearing denied, 623 F.2d 1303 (1980), aff'd, 49 
U.S.L.W. 4623 (U.S. June 8, 1981). 
165. Although they initially stated a claim under the Equal Pay Act, plaintiffs were 
forced to sue under Title VII because, at the time of employment, the Equal Pay Act did 
not apply to government employees. 602 F.2d at 886 n.4. 
166. Essentially, this would require a claim that the matrons were discriminated 
against in terms of compensation, because their wages were determined by gender. Such 
a claim seems to counter the Equal Pay Act defense that wages were set by any other 
factor other than sex. 
167. It is important to note this is the first case where a finding that equal work was 
not performed did not prevent the court from determining that some other discrimina-
tion might be involved. 
168. 602 F.2d at 890 (footnote omitted). 
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Act are authoritative where plaintiffs suing under 
Title VII raise a claim of equal pay, plaintiffs are 
not precluded from suing under Title VII to pro-
test other discriminatory compensation practices 
unless the practices are authorized [by the Equal 
Pay Act's defenses].169 
835 
The Ninth Circuit subsequently issued a second opinion in Gun-
ther,170 in response to a petition for rehearing, to clarify its posi-
tion. The court did not fully embrace a theory of comparable 
worth. Rather, they seemed to respond to the Fifth, Tenth, and 
Eighth Circuits' refusal to review wage discrimination cases that 
did not meet the Equal Pay Act requirements, even when there 
had been no allegation of "substantially equal" work. In the sec-
ond opinion, the Ninth Circuit stated: 
The effect of our decision will not be to substitute 
a "comparable" work standard for an "equal" 
work standard. Where a Title VII plaintiff . . . 
attempts to establish a prima facie case based 
solely on a comparison of the work she performs, 
she will have to show that her job requirements 
are substantially equal, not comparable, to that of 
a similarly situated male. . . . All we hold here is 
that a plaintiff is not precluded from establishing 
sex-based wage discrimination under some other 
theory compatible with Title VII. It is unneces-
sary to determine now what theories might be 
feasible. We do note that, because a comparable 
work standard cannot be substituted for an equal 
work standard, evidence of comparable work, al-
though not necessarily irrelevant in proving dis-
crimination under some alternative theory, will 
not alone be sufficient to establish a prima facie 
case.171 
Thus, the Gunther court hesitantly set out the foundations 
of a theory of comparable worth. According to the court, an alle-
gation that different wages are paid to workers performing jobs 
of comparable worth, without some further charge of discrimina-
tion, is insufficient to establish a prima facie case under Title 
169. ld. at 891. 
170 . .623 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1979). 
171. ld. at 1321. 
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VII.172 Although the court did not specify under what situations 
or alternative theories job comparisons might be relevant, one of 
the most recent compensation discrimination cases presents an 
excellent example.l7S 
D. IUE v. WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORP. 
In IUE v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,174 the Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals applied the standard suggested in Gunther.175 
Plaintiffs, members of the Electrical Union, charged their em-
ployer, Westinghouse, with wage discrimination under Title VII. 
Westinghouse used a wage classification system in which each 
job was assigned a labor grade number based on the number of 
points tallied, with lower grades receiving lower salaries.176 The 
job evaluations were originally done in 1939 and a keysheet was 
developed at that time which enumerated wages of jobs at each 
level. Separate keysheets were maintained for jobs filled by wo-
men and jobs filled by men; the grade levels on the women's 
keysheet received lower wages than identical levels on the men's 
list.177 In 1965, Westinghouse devised a new single keysheet, 
which plaintiffs contended merely disguised the old discrimina-
tory system. Female jobs were placed far below male jobs given 
equivalent grades on the old keysheets. Company records 
showed that all employees but one, working in labor grades one 
through four, were women, and that eighty-five percent of the 
women working at the plant were assigned to these low level 
jobs.l7S 
Plaintiffs contented the grades were assigned according to 
whether the position had been traditionally filled by a woman or 
a man, and that predominantly female jobs were assigned lower 
wages, resulting in a highly unequal pay distribution. The dis-
trict court found that, because the plaintiffs did not allege that 
male and female employees performed "substantially equal" 
172. [d. 
173. See note 176 infra and accompanying text. 
174. 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980). 
175. See text accompanying note 171 supra. 
176. See notes 187-210 infra and accompanying text. 
177. As the 1939 Westinghouse Industrial Relations Manual explained: "Basically 
then, we have another wage curve or key sheet for women below and not parallel with, 
the men's curve." 631 F.2d at 1097 (emphasis in original). 
178. [d. 
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work, the employer had not violated Title VII.179 On appeal, the 
Third Circuit was unable to ignore Westinghouse's discrimina-
tory employment practices and reversed the district COurt.180 
Mer deciding the Bennett Amendment incorporated only 
the four enumerated Equal Pay Act defenses into Title VII,18l 
the court reviewed the allegation of wage discrimination. The 
court found Westinghouse's system blatantly discriminated 
against women workers. Although the plaintiffs' claim was based 
on discriminatory compensation, that compensation had been 
determined by a discriminatory evaluation system. Because Ti-
tle VII clearly prohibits an employer from paying workers per-
forming different jobs different wages if wages are determined 
by race or religion, the court determined that 
[i]n the absence of explicit statutory language or 
Supreme Court holdings to the contrary, we are 
hesitant to conclude that Title VII would allow 
discriminatory behavior on the basis of sex, when 
the same behavior would be prohibited if made on 
the basis of race, religion, or national origin.182 
In Gunther, the Ninth Circuit held that a prima facie case 
would not be established solely on a showing of job comparabil-
ity but that wage discrimination could be proven under "some 
other theory compatible with Title VII."l8S In JUE, the plaintiffs 
proved wage discrimination by showing a discriminatory job 
evaluation system, thus providing an alternative theory of dis-
crimination. Evidence supporting the theory showed the jobs in 
question had at one time been given identical labor grades and, 
therefore, were of comparable worth to the employer, but that 
wages had been determined by the sex of the employee and not 
according to worth. Although never explicitly articulated, JUE 
allowed a comparison of dissimilar jobs to prove 
discrimination.18' 
179. 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 119144 (D.N.J. 1979). 
180. 631 F.2d. at 1094. 
181. [d. at 1101. 
182. [d. at 1100 (footnote omitted). 
183. 623 F.2d at 1321. 
184. 631 F.2d at 1094. 
37
Lipsig: Equal Pay
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1981
838 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:801 
V. PROVING A COMPARABLE WORTH CASE 
It is difficult to prove that an employer has committed wage 
discrimination against women. With IUE as a guide, it appears 
some courts may be willing to compare different jobs in situa-
tions where there are intentional wage differentials between 
male and female jobs not covered by the narrow language of the 
Equal Pay Act.1811 The Ninth Circuit and Third Circuits require 
a showing of a discriminatory practice before a claim of compa-
rable worth will be discussed.186 Often, as in IUE, wage discrimi-
nation is confirmed either by the employer's method of setting 
wages, or its job evaluation system. 
A. METHODS USED TO SET WAGES 
Employers use a wide range of methods to set wages. Un-
derstanding these methods may be crucial in proving wage dis-
crimination under Title VII. Although many employers use com-
plex methods of wage determination, some continue to use the 
basic ranking method. With this method, the employer fixes 
wages by observing a job and ranking it in relation to other 
jobs.187 The hazard of the ranking method is that the employer 
may allow biased personal preference, about current employees 
and the job itself, to weight the determination.188 
The market method is a second method used to set wages.189 
The employer matches the wages of employees to those of simi-
larly situated employees, in the community or any other compet-
itive unit in the labor market.190 Thus, if women have been tra-
ditionally segregated into low-paying jobs in the local labor 
market, an employer will only perpetuate existing wage discrimi-
185. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (Supp. II 1978). 
186. Gunther v. County of Washington, 602 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1979), rehearing de-
nied, 623 F.2d 1303 (1980), a/f'd, 49 U.S.L.W. 4623 (U.S. June 8, 1981); ruE v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980). 
187. R. SmSON, COMPENSATION: A COMPLETE REVISION OF "WAGES AND SALARIES" 38-
39 (1974). See Cody, The Comparable Worth Slot Machine: Does Job Evaluation Give 
Every Player an Even Break?, 1 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE GUIDE IV-15 (J. Erickson, 
K. McGovern eds. 1979). 
188. R. SmsoN, supra note 187, at 38. Cody, supra note 187, at IV-28, points out, 
however, that from an employer's perspective this method is easy to use, easy to under-
stand, consumes little time, and minimizes paperwork. 
189. R. SmsoN, supra note 187, at 44. 
190. [d. 
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nation by adopting a market standard.l9l The market method is 
generally used with a classification system as a means of rating 
job levels, such as Typist I or Assistant Researcher III. While 
the classification system may be facially gender-neutral, discrim-
ination can occur when wage classifications are made in accor-
dance with what a similar job has traditionally paid in the labor 
market. The market method was approved by the court in Lem-
ons, even though it resulted in discriminatory wage levels for 
city nurses.I92 
A classification system may also be applied independent of 
market comparisons, using a rating scale based on internal com-
pany grade levels.I93 This technique can be subjective, for even 
though all jobs are set against the same standard and treated 
alike, the system tends to depend on arbitrarily assigned job 
levels within the organizational hierarchy rather than levels of 
work performance.I9' 
191. From an employer's point of view this may be an advantage. 
The major advantage of the market evaluation system is 
that the market is built into the program from the start, 
thereby insuring that evaluation results conform to the reali-
ties of the marketplace . • . . 
. . . In the traditional evaluation approach . • . no one 
can ever really satisfactorily explain why a salesman is in a 
higher grade than, say, an accountant. But if the answer is 
that salesmen at a given level are paid more than accountants 
at a given level that is simply describing what exists. The com-
pany did not make these judgments; the labor market did. 
The market has valued work done and the experience that 
goes with doing the work. These are clearly more objective 
than subjective job evaluation decisions and therefore tend to 
be more acceptable to employees. 
[d. at 44-45 (emphasis in original). 
Unfortunately, this method has also been acceptable to the courts. See, e.g., Lemons 
v. City of Denver, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 244 (1980). The 
employer may rely on the market system as justification for paying women less than 
men. 
192. City jobs were first classified, then compared to the equivalent private sector 
jobs, and assigned wages accordingly. Plaintiffs argued that the city's scheme upheld the 
traditional under-valuation of nursing as a woman's job, and that their jobs should be 
compared with non-nursing positions of equal value. 620 F.2d at 229. 
193. Under this method, an employer assigns each job a grade level, and starts the 
pay scale with Grade One, for example, which would receive the lowest salary. Salaries 
increase with higher grades, but all jobs on the same level receive equal pay. R. SIBSON, 
supra note 187, at 40. 
194. Cody, supra note 187, at IV-27. 
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More complex methods are the point/factor method and a 
variation, the factor comparison method.191S Under the more 
common point method,196 jobs are analyzed and broken down 
into compensable factors and subfactors,197 which in turn receive 
195. R. SmsoN, supra note 187, at 40-42. 
196. ld. at 40. 
197. Cody lists the following possible factors and subfactors: 
1. EXPERIENCE 
A. Number of areas in which experience is required to 
perform job effectively. 
B. Amount of experience in each area required to per-
form job satisfactorily. 
2. EDUCATION AND TRAINING 
A. Number of areas in which education/training is 
required. 
B. Type of education/training: General-Technical 
C. Frequency of use of education/training on job. 
3. MENTAL DEMAND 
A. Degree of mental application required. 
B. Continuity of mental alertness. 
C. Degree of diversity of mental demand. 
4. VISUAL DEMAND 
A. Degree of visual alertness required. 
B. Continuity of visual alertness. 
5. PHYSICAL DEMANDS 
A. Pace of physical input. 
B. Strength/endurance required. 
C. Degree of continuity. 
6. COMPLEXITY OF DUTIES 
A. Types and diversity of problems handled: Routine -
Nonroutine. 
B. Frequency of problems arising. 
C. Amount of work required to respond to problems. 
7. PSYCHOLOGICAL AND EMOTIONAL DEMANDS 
A. Number, types, and frequency of deadlines to be 
met. 
B. Routine pace of job (rate of work turn-around). 
C. How is work reviewed and by whom? 
8. CONFINEMENT DEMANDS 
A. Physical confinement. 
B. Mental confinement; monotony. 
C. Job potential confinement (dead-end job?). 
9. HAZARDS/WORKING CONDITIONS 
A. Probability of accidents/health hazards. 
B. Severity of accidents/health hazards. 
10. ABILITY TO EFFECT RESULTS 
A. Independence of action. 
B. Exercise of judgment/creativity. 
11. ERRORS 
A. How easily discerned. 
B. Impact of error on orderly work flow. 
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point values based on the factor's importance or worth to the 
employer. Wages are set according to the point value. ISS A varia-
tion of this method is the factor comparison method, which as-
signs points to each job for the same standard factors, each of 
which carry equal weight. ISS Jobs with equal points yield equal 
wages. 
Although the point/factor system is facially objective, it can 
be discriminatory. Because the employer may give more weight 
to factors such as physical effort or technical training, jobs 
predominantly filled by women may be undervalued':~oo 
C. Frequency of probability for error. 
12. CONTACT WITH OTHERS 
A. Frequency of contact. 
B. Nature of contact/type of impact to be had by 
individual. 
C. How contacts made; individual VB. group. 
D. Type of people contacted/range. 
E. Skill required in contact: routine courtesy-creating 
rapport- nonroutine decisions. 
F. Loyalty to company/product. 
13. RESPONSmILITY FOR CONFIDENTIAL DATA 
A. Character of data. 
B. Degree to which full import of data is apparent on 
the job. 
14. RESPONSmILITY FOR RECORDS AND REPORTS 
A. Degree of care required to prevent inaccuracies. 
B. Degree of loss/disruptive effect would result from 
inaccuracies. 
15. RESPONSmILITY FOR MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT, 
AND PRODUCT 
A. Dollar value of equipment, etc. 
B. Degree of care required to prevent mishap. 
Cody, supra note 187, at IV-29 to IV-3!. 
198. Wages are usually determined by isolating certain jobs as benchmark or key 
jobs, and wages paid these jobs are matched to the point value assigned to them. A graph 
is drawn with benchmark jobs marked on a wage line and all other jobs are aligned into 
the correct place on the point scale. Grades and ranges are established on the graphs in 
varying widths. [d. at IV-18. 
199. These factors might include skill, physical demands, mental demands, responsi-
bility, and working conditions. A benchmark system may be used to fix wages. The main 
difference between factor comparison and point/factor is that in factor comparison all 
jobs are rated by a standard set of factors with equal values, while in point/factor analy-
sis any number of variable factors may appear. The employer will weigh each factor for 
value, rather than giving each factor equal value. Both these methods are complex and 
involve a great deal of paperwork. [d. 
200. [d. at IV-28. 
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B. PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION 
Because the job evaluation process can be discriminatory,201 
discovery of an employer's wage determination method may re-
veal inherent discrimination in compensation. In IUE202 the 
plaintiffs used records of evaluation practices to prove inten-
tional compensation discrimination. Westinghouse ostensibly 
used a modified factor comparison method to set wages, but the 
plaintiffs proved the method was not used fairly when rating 
women's jobs.203 Only after the plaintiffs demonstrated that 
Westinghouse used discriminatory evaluation practices did the 
Third Circuit examine the jobs in question, and compare them 
with other company jobs to determine if they had been under-
valued.2M The employer's evaluation practice, by itself, was a vi-
olation of Title VII; it constituted intentional discrimination 
against women in terms of compensation. 
The fact situation in IUE is a model of the Ninth Circuit's 
suggestion in Gunther05 that, while mere proof of comparable 
work is insufficient to establish a prima facie case under Title 
VII, proof of comparable worth can be used under some theory 
other than equal work and be compatible with Title VII. An al-
ternative theory suggested by plaintiffs in IUE was that the em-
ployer had engaged in discriminatory job evaluations, which re-
sulted in wage inequality.206 Examining this assertion, the court 
found a violation of Title VII based on gender-classified job 
evaluations. IUE involved blatant discrimination by the em-
ployer, while most forms of discrimination are subtle and more 
difficult to prove. It is important to note the Third Circuit's de-
cision did not directly concern the use of a bona fide evaluation 
system which may have a discriminatory effect, but only speaks 
to an evaluation system discriminatorily implemented. 
One can only speculate whether the Third and Ninth Cir-
201. Despite the discriminatory effect of some job evaluations, detailed evaluation 
methods may lead to fairer wage determination. Several professional consulting firms 
have experimented with nondiscriminatory wage programs for willing employers. See, 
e.g., COMPENSATION INSTITUTE, COMPARABLE WORTH ANALYSIS QUESTIONAIRE (1980). 
202. 631 F.2d at 1097. 
203. ld. See notes 178-180 supra and accompanying text. 
204.ld. 
205. 623 F.2d at 1320. 
206. 631 F.2d at 1096. 
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cuits will be willing to extend their decisions to include situa-
tions in which the employer's job evaluation method, though ob-
jectively sound, discriminates against women in application.207 
Where wages are set through the use of factor comparisons, for 
example, the factors themselves may be rated in a discrimina-
tory fashion. Clerical skills may be given lower point values than 
physical skills, resulting in wage differentials. Facially, the eval-
uation method is objective because factors are applied uniformly 
to all jobs, but the factors themselves are discriminatory. While 
this hypothetical situation would constitute a "disparate im-
pact" type of violation of Title VII if proved, it could not be 
proved without an initial comparable worth analysis of the jobs 
in question. 
A more difficult problem of proof, following the Gunther-
JUE model, occurs when the employer can show it acted in good 
faith, but its evaluation methods have a disparate impact none-
theless. For example, in Christensen208 and Lemons,209 the em-
ployers used bona fide evaluation systems for classifying jobs, 
but actual wages were determined according to the local job 
market. The employers' wages merely reflected the discrimina-
tory practices in the community. This type of fact situation 
presented several difficulties for the courts. Not only were they 
asked to find a violation of Title VII when the employer had not 
directly instituted discriminatory practices, they were also asked 
to force the employer to engage in detailed job comparisons and 
suffer possible economic loss by setting wages in disregard of lo-
cal supply and demand. Neither court felt it could implement 
these demands. Were a court willing, however, proof would have 
207. In a situation in which the employer used a point/factor method of job evalua-
tion, for example, and factors associated with women's work were assigned less weight 
than other factors, the court would have to make a determination that certain factors 
should carry the same weight, i.e., that they are of comparable worth. Support for this 
contention might be found in production records, profit charts, or independent studies. 
One commentator suggests that the plaintiff should only have to show the existence of 
job segregation and differing pay to establish a prima facie claim of wage discrimination. 
The burden would then fall on the employer to prove the wages were not lower because 
the job in question was a woman's job. Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segrega-
tion and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1974, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 397, 462 (1979). 
For an argument against this approach, see Nelson, Opton & Wilson, Wage Discrimina-
tion and the 'Comparable Worth' Theory in Perspective, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 233, 279 
(1980). 
208. 563 F.2d 353. 
209. 620 F.2d 228. 
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to be twofold. The plaintiff would have to first prove wages in 
the local job market were discriminatory (necessitating proof of 
comparability), and then prove the employer discriminated by 
applying the community standard to its own establishment. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Title VII prohibits discrimination in compensation on the 
basis of sex. While Title VII may reiterate certain protections 
offered by the Equal Pay Act, it provides an independent basis 
for a claim of wage discrimination. Title VII offers protection to 
women underpaid, either because of job segregation or an em-
ployer's undervaluation of women's work; there is nothing in the 
statute that prevents a claim of discrimination based on unequal 
pay for comparable worth. Barriers to judicial acceptance of 
such a claim, however, lie beyond the realm of statutory 
construction. 
While the Ninth and Third Circuits have cautiously wid-
ened the scope of a wage discrimination claim, no court has al-
lowed a mere showing of comparable worth of jobs as sufficient 
proof of a Title VII violation. Because unequal pay for compara-
ble worth is not a per se violation of Title VII, it must be predi-
cated on some specific, articulable discriminatory practice or ef-
fect. It seems unlikely courts will extend Gunther to recognize a 
Title VII claim based merely on a showing that the plaintiff was 
denied equal pay for work of comparable worth to the employer. 
Judicial reluctance to accept or develop this theory partially 
results from pressure from the business sector. 210 When courts 
scrutinize the laws of supply and demand for "fairness," they 
are accused of interfering with the economic structure; when 
they consider requiring employers to reassess the job worth and 
to set wages accordingly, they are accused of usurping the right 
210. The market method can provide a cover for businesses which seek to avoid 
complex evaluation systems. Vice-President of Employee Compensation at Bank of 
America, John Turney, favors use of the market method, in conjunction with a classifica-
tion system, to more detailed systems. He stated that evaluation systems such as point 
factor merely "clutter up" the basic practice of setting wages at a level competitive with 
those in the community market. Because systematic evaluation methods are often the 
only documentation of discriminatory practices, an employer is better off using the illu-
sive, changing scale of the market place. Conversation with John Turney, Vice President, 
Employee Compensation, Bank of America, San Francisco (Nov. 17, 1980). 
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of the employer to engage in free enterprise.211 Nevertheless, de-
spite strong resistance from business interests, the courts fre-
quently engage in such interference to insure equal protection 
and fairness in other business-related areas. An undue solicitude 
prevents it here. 
While the courts need a firm directive from Congress before 
they are likely to hold against the alleged business interests, 
plaintiffs may be able to strengthen the theory of comparable 
worth through litigation .. Although individual litigation appears 
to benefit only the plaintiff with compensation for lost wages, 
litigation has a strong impact on the employer. Employers who 
anticipate adverse judgments may be compelled to re-evaluate 
their own practices and exchange them for methods that com-
pensate women employees for the actual value of their work.212 
211. See A Business Group Fights "Comparable Worth," Bus. WEEK, Nov. 10, 1980, 
at 100, which discusses the rise of business groups such as the Equal Employment Advi-
sory Council (EEAC), that concentrates on filing amicus curiae briefs in Title VII cases, 
and whose board of directors includes officials of General Electric, Exxon, Sears, General 
Motors, and Prudential Insurance. The latest EEAC cause is the fight against compara-
ble worth. Malcolm Lovell, a board member of the EEAC, states the organization's goal: 
"We have to tackle comparable worth before a law is passed. It could come down to 
whether a group of bureaucrats or the market is going to determine wages." [d. at 105, 
col. 2. 
212. As this Comment went to press, the Supreme Court affirmed Gunther, 5-4. 49 
U.S.L.W. 4623 (U.S. June 8, 1981) (per Brennan, J.j Blackmun, Marshall, Stevens and 
White, J.J. joining in the 9pinion. Rehnquist, J., med a dissent, joined by Burger, C.J., 
Powell and Stewart, J.J.). The Court determined that the legislative history of the Equal 
Pay Act and Title VII, as well as the policy and language of the employment discrinlina-
tion provisions of the Civil Rights Act, supported the Ninth Circuit's conclusions. The 
Court sidestepped the issue of comparable worth, however, by narrowly framing the issue 
as "whether respondents' failure to satisfy the equal work standard of the Equal Pay Act 
in itself precludes their proceeding under Title VII." [d. at 4625. 
The Court concluded that the Bennett Amendment merely incorporates the Equal 
Pay Act defenses into Title VII and that any other interpretation would "insulate • • • 
blatantly discriminatory practices from judicial redress under Title VII." [d. at 4628. It 
did not, however, decide the "precise contours of lawsuits challenging sex discrimination 
in comp.ensation under Title VII." [d. at 4629. 
The dissent followed the reasoning of the Eighth and Tenth Circuits, found fault 
with the majority's reliance on policy instead of strict rules of construction, and con-
cluded that the Equal Pay Act governs all compensation discrimination suits. 
While the majority opinion provides little guidance for the Title VII plaintiff, and 
despite the Court's refusal to directly address the issue of comparable worth, the deci-
sion is important to women. The Court has opened t~e way for the use-however lim-
ited~f job comparisons in wage discrimination suits. 
45
Lipsig: Equal Pay
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1981
